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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 15-2785 
___________ 
 
DENNIS KEITH DIXON,     
       
  Appellant 
 
v. 
 
STERN & EISENBURG, PC and Employees; DOES 1-50 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 5:14-cv-04551) 
District Judge: Honorable Joseph F. Leeson, Junior 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
June 8, 2016 
Before:  FISHER, SHWARTZ and COWEN, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: June 13, 2016) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
PER CURIAM 
 Dennis Dixon appeals pro se from an order of the District Court granting summary 
judgment in favor of the defendants.  We will affirm.  
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 On behalf of its client, Wells Fargo Bank, NA, Appellee Stern & Eisenberg PC 
mailed a series of notices to Dixon and his spouse, captioned as “Combined Notice Under 
Act 6 and Act 91 – Take Action to Save Your Home From Foreclosure.”  The notices 
stated that Dixon’s mortgage on his home was in default, and described Dixon’s rights as 
homeowner in addition to setting out avenues for repayment assistance.  The notices 
identified the property address, the loan account number, the Original Lender (as “Option 
One Mortgage Corporation, a California Corporation”), and the Current Lender/Servicer 
(as “Wells Fargo Bank, National Association as Trustee for ABFC 2006-OPT1 Trust, 
Asset Backed Funding Corporation Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-OPT1[;] By 
its Servicer, Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC”).  The notices set out the total amount past due 
and provided Ocwen’s mailing address for the submission of any payment to cure the 
default.  Dixon sued.   
 Dixon’s complaint, filed in the District Court on July 31, 2014, alleged that Stern 
& Eisenberg PC and fifty unnamed employees violated the Fair Debt Collections 
Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq.  After Dixon amended his complaint 
and the defendants moved to dismiss the case for the failure to state a claim, the District 
Court notified the parties that it intended to convert the dismissal motion to a motion for 
summary judgment, and provided the parties time to submit any additional materials.  
The District Court thereafter granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants.  This 
appeal followed. 
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 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review 
over a district court’s grant of summary judgment, applying the same standard that the 
district court used.  Jensen v. Pressler & Pressler, 791 F.3d 413, 416-17 (3d Cir. 2015).  
Summary judgment is appropriate when “the movant shows that there is no genuine 
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 
 The FDCPA prohibits a debt collector from conduct that harasses, oppresses, or 
abuses a person.  15 U.S.C. § 1692d.  A debt collector also may not “use any false, 
deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any 
debt.”  15 U.S.C. § 1692e.  The FDCPA further prohibits debt collectors from using 
unfair or unconscionable means of collecting a debt.  15 U.S.C. § 1692f.  And, the 
FDCPA sets requirements for notice to consumers and rules for the validation of debts 
that consumers dispute in writing.  15 U.S.C. § 1692g.  The statute also restricts the use 
of forms that create the false impression that a person or entity other than the debtor is 
involved with the collection of a debt.  15 U.S.C. § 1692j.  Dixon’s complaint invokes all 
of these subsections. 
 Notwithstanding that scattershot approach to Dixon’s attempt to invoke the 
FDCPA, Dixon’s case primarily concerns § 1692e, which prohibits the use of “use any 
false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means[.]”  Dixon argues that the notices 
that he received were deceptive.  In essence, Dixon believes that Stern & Eisenberg PC 
violated the FDCPA because there were purported defects in the way that his mortgage 
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was conveyed to Wells Fargo from the original lender.  Although Dixon spins this 
argument thread into a tapestry of FDCPA allegations, the key question is whether there 
is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Stern & Eisenberg PC was deceptive 
when it listed Wells Fargo as the “Current Lender” on the notices it sent.  There is not. 
 We consider whether the least sophisticated debtor would find a debt collector’s 
statement deceptive or misleading, applying an objective standard.  Jensen, 791 F.3d at 
419-20.  The standard is lower than that of a “reasonable debtor,” id. at 418, and it 
“prevents liability for bizarre or idiosyncratic interpretations of collection notices by 
preserving a quotient of reasonableness and presuming a basic level of understanding and 
willingness to read with care.”  Lesher v. Law Offices of Mitchell N. Kay, PC, 650 F.3d 
993, 997 (3d Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Also, “[a] debtor simply 
cannot be confused, deceived, or misled by an incorrect statement unless it is material.”  
Jensen, 791 F.3d at 421.  A statement is material “if it is capable of influencing the 
decision of the least sophisticated debtor.”  Id. 
 Dixon’s arguments focus almost entirely on issues he has with how the mortgage 
was assigned to Wells Fargo.  But in the notices, Stern & Eisenberg PC did not explicitly 
represent anything about any procedures or technicalities of any assignment concerning 
the mortgage.  The details of the chain of assignment do not appear directly relevant to 
any statement in the notices, which focus on disclosing a debtor’s rights and remedies.  
Whatever might or might not have occurred concerning the technicalities of the 
assignment to Wells Fargo is not material under the circumstances of this case.  See id. at 
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420-21; Hahn v. Triumph P’ships LLC, 557 F.3d 755, 758 (7th Cir. 2009) (“A statement 
cannot mislead unless it is material, so a false but non-material statement is not 
actionable.”).  Moreover, as the District Court observed, Dixon has already lost a case 
concerning whether it was permissible for his mortgage to be assigned under the terms of 
the mortgage and related agreements.  See Dixon v. Option One Mortgage Corp., et al., 
No. 5:13-cv-3199, at D. Ct. Doc. No. 17. 
 Nor has Dixon shown that the mere act of naming Wells Fargo as the “Current 
Lender” is material for purposes of enforcing the FDCPA.  Dixon does not state or offer 
any evidence that he has attempted to send mortgage payments that he owes to some 
other entity, that he was confused about how to cure a default, or that he risked (or feared 
that he risked) the prospect of having to satisfy the same debt to multiple parties.  Cf. 
Rajamin v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co., 757 F.3d 79, 85 (2d Cir. 2014) (finding lack 
of Article III standing to challenge an assignment when plaintiffs had “not pleaded or 
otherwise suggested that they ever paid defendants more than the amounts due [on their 
note], or that they ever received a bill or demand from any entity other than defendants,” 
or that there was “any threat or institution of foreclosure proceedings . . . by any entity 
other than defendants”).  In addition, Dixon has never set out how the hypothetical “least 
sophisticated debtor” might have had a doubt about how to satisfy its debt obligations, 
regardless of whether he was confused himself.  See Jensen, 791 F.3d at 419-20 (the 
“least sophisticated debtor” is an objective standard). 
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 For its part, Stern & Eisenberg PC has produced the note held by Wells Fargo, 
which is a negotiable instrument that is indorsed “in blank” in this case.  That means that 
the holder in due course of the note is entitled to all rights under the note, including the 
right to enforce payment of the debt.  See J.P. Morgan Chase Bank v. Murray, 63 A.3d 
1258, 1266 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2013) (“[W]e conclude that the Note secured by the Mortgage 
in the instant case is a negotiable instrument under the PUCC.  As such we find [the 
defendant’s] challenges to the chain of possession by which [plaintiff] came to hold the 
Note immaterial to its enforceability[.]”).  The note is the instrument reflecting Dixon’s 
promise to repay the debt, and it is not deceptive to call Wells Fargo the creditor under 
these facts.  And contrary to Dixon’s argument, it is not material on these facts that the 
written assignments that Stern & Eisenberg PC recorded post-date when it sent the 
notices.  Wells Fargo’s creditor status here is not dependent on a written memorialization 
and recordation of an assignment of the mortgage.  See 13 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3205(b) (“an 
instrument becomes payable to bearer and may be negotiated by transfer of possession 
alone until specially indorsed.”) (emphasis added); Murray, 63 A.3d at 1266. 
 Thus, for purposes of Dixon’s claims in this case, there is no genuine issue of 
material fact that for Stern & Eisenberg PC to name Wells Fargo as the “Current Lender” 
in the notices it sent was truthful, to the extent it was even a material statement for it to 
do so.  See Powell v. Palisades Acquisition XVI, LLC, 782 F.3d 119, 125 (4th Cir. 2014) 
(“[T]he record clearly shows that the judgment against Powell had indeed been assigned 
by Platinum Financial to Palisades and that the defendants’ representation of this fact was 
7 
 
therefore not false.”); Hahn, 557 F.3d at 757 (“[A]s we have concluded that the statement 
is true, the case is over.”). 
 Dixon also argues that Stern & Eisenberg PC’s act of recording the mortgage 
assignments to Wells Fargo after it had sent the notices was itself a deceptive act that 
amounts to a separate and independent FDCPA violation.  The FDCPA, however, 
prohibits debt collectors from using false or misleading representations “in connection 
with the collection of any debt.”  15 U.S.C. § 1692e (emphasis added).  Under the 
circumstances of this case and viewing the record as a whole, it is evident that recording 
those mortgage assignments was not connected to the notices that Stern & Eisenberg PC 
sent, and there is nothing in the record showing that the recording was otherwise used in 
connection with a further effort to collect on a debt.   
 Rather, recording the assignments protects the creditor from the circumstance 
where a downstream bona fide purchaser obtains the property without notice of the 
mortgage, and does not affect the validity of any assignment itself of the right to collect 
on the debt that the mortgage secures.  See Montgomery County v. MERSCORP Inc., 
795 F.3d 372, 376-77 (3d Cir. 2015) (holding that Pennsylvania law does not create a 
duty to record all land conveyances and observing that recording is not necessary to 
validly convey property).  Section 1692e does not apply to the circumstances presented 
here involving Stern & Eisenberg PC’s efforts to later record the mortgage assignment.  
 The claims under the other FDCPA provisions that Dixon cites fail as well.  
Section 1692d concerns conduct that harasses, oppresses, or abuses a person.  
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Considering Dixon’s allegations and the summary judgment record as a whole, the only 
conduct that could even potentially have been thought to harass, oppress, or abuse was 
that Stern & Eisenberg PC sent six copies of the notices to Dixon and his spouse, rather 
than just one copy.  As the defendants noted, however, they sent those notices in order to 
comply with state law.  See Pennsylvania Loan Interest and Protection Law (“Act 6”), 41 
Pa. Stat. Ann. §§ 101 et seq.; Pennsylvania Housing Finance Agency Law (“Act 91”), 35 
Pa. Stat. Ann. §§ 1680.401c et seq.  The multiple mailings that Dixon received merely 
covered the different names and addresses indicated on the mortgage documents, plus the 
need to send via both regular and certified mail.  Otherwise, there is no evidence in the 
record that any defendant wrote again, called, visited, or otherwise contacted Dixon or his 
spouse.  We conclude that the defendants’ straightforward and one-time effort to comply 
with state and federal notice requirements through one round of mailings, with no other 
communication set out in the record, does not violate 15 U.S.C. § 1692d. 
 Relatedly, sending those required notices to the debtor was not an unfair or 
unconscionable means of collecting a debt under the circumstances of this case.  See 15 
U.S.C. § 1692f.  The only potentially “unfair” practice concerned the contention that the 
assignment to Wells Fargo was not proper; as discussed above, the evidence of the 
possession of the indorsed-in-blank mortgage note precludes that argument.   
 The record also shows no genuine issue of material fact concerning whether Stern 
& Eisenberg PC complied with § 1692g.  That statutory provision concerns procedures 
when a consumer disputes a debt.  Notably, as the District Court concluded, the provision 
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does not require a debt collector to independently investigate a debt before it begins 
collection activities, let alone affirmatively verify every aspect of the chain of assignment 
of the right to collect on a debt.  See, e.g., Clark v. Capital Credit & Collection Servs., 
Inc., 460 F.3d 1162, 1174 (9th Cir. 2006) (“Within reasonable limits, [debt collectors] 
were entitled to rely on their client’s statements to verify the debt. . . . [and] the FDCPA 
did not impose upon them any duty to investigate independently the claims presented by 
[the creditor].”); Chaudhry v. Gallerizzo, 174 F.3d 394, 406 (4th Cir. 1999) (noting that 
verification does not require a debt collector to “vouch for the validity of the underlying 
debt”) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Rather, that provision requires a debt collector 
to seek information about a debt from the creditor once a consumer disputes a debt.  See 
Graziano v. Harrison, 950 F.2d 107, 113 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding that after verification 
was requested, the information provided was “sufficient to inform [the debtor] of the 
amounts of his debts, the services provided, and the dates on which the debts were 
incurred.”).  Nothing in the record shows, and Dixon does not argue, that Dixon sent the 
requisite written notice disputing the debt.  Claims based on this provision therefore have 
no evidentiary support as well. 
 Finally, we may easily dispense with the purported violations under 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1692j, which bars the use of forms that may create the false impression about who is 
involved with collecting a debt.  So far as the lenders’ side of things is concerned, the 
notices that Stern & Eisenberg PC sent to Dixon do not identify any person or entity other 
than Stern & Eisenberg PC, Wells Fargo NA, and Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC.  None of 
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the notices can be read as constituting a “form” that created the impression that any 
additional entity was participating in the collection of the debt.  And, as discussed above, 
Wells Fargo NA was not misrepresented as the “Lender” for purposes of providing notice 
to Dixon and his spouse, and Dixon has produced no evidence of—let alone even 
named—any other entity that should have been listed so as to avoid creating a false 
impression about who was involved in the collection effort.  Consequently, there is also 
no genuine issue of material fact that the defendants complied with 15 U.S.C. § 1692j. 
 The District Court was correct to grant summary judgment in favor of Stern & 
Eisenberg, PC and the unnamed defendants.  Consequently, we will affirm the District 
Court’s judgment.     
